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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

Case No. 880101

vs.
Priority 2

JAMES DEVON LANIER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery,
a first degree felony, after a jury trial in the Third District
Court.

This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah

Code Ann- § 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred reversibly in denying
defendant's motion to exclude evidence of his prior convictions
pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with Aggravated Robbery, a first
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (Supp.
1987).
A jury convicted defendant as charged on July 1, 1987,
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
presiding.

Judge Moffat sentenced defendant to serve an

indeterminate term of five years to life in the Utah State
Prison.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 20, 1986, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Gilbert
Martinez, the owner of G.E.M. Music Store, waited on a woman who
inquired about expensive electric guitars and microphones on
display at the store (R. 167-8).

The woman left after

ascertaining the store's closing time.

An hour later, a man

wearing dark clothing and a baseball cap rushed into the store
and ran toward Mr. Martinez, who stood about 30 feet away from
the store's door (R. 170). Pointing a gun to Mr. Martinez'
cheek, the man forced him into a back room, made him lay face
down on the floor and sat on his back (R. 1781-3).

With the gun

pressed against the back of Mr. Martinez' head, the man attempted
unsuccessfully to remove Mr. Martinez' ring and watch.

However,

the man succeeded in removing some cash from his pockets and
wallet (R. 173-4).
A few minutes passed during which Mr. Martinez heard
the store's front door open a few times, then his captor yelled
"are you ready?"

(R. 174.)

A female voice answered

affirmatively from the front of the store and the man left,
warning Mr. Martinez to stay down (R. 175). Mr. Martinez
returned to the empty store and discovered that expensive
equipment had been stolen (R. 176, 180).

On July 2, Mr. Martinez positively identified defendant
from a group of photographs (R. 178). A few days later, Debbie
Alder was arrested and charged in connection with the robbery of
the G.E.M. Music Store (R. 262). Ms. Alder, the woman on whom
Mr. Martinez waited an hour prior to the robbery, named defendant
as an accomplice in the G.E.M. Music Store robbery (R. 263). A
few weeks later, Mr. Martinez picked defendant out of a nine-man
line-up (R. 179).
At trial, both Mr. Martinez and Ms. Alder identified
defendant as the perpetrator of the G.E.M. Music Store robbery
(R. 170, 212). Subsequently, the jury convicted defendant as
charged.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's prior convictions were admissible under
either Rule 609(a)(1) or (2). The probative value of the
convictions for impeachment outweighed their prejudicial effect.
But this balancing test need not be re-evaluated by this Court
because defendant's convictions were admissible as crimes
involving dishonesty under subpart (2).
Even if the convictions were inadmissible, the trial
court's ruling was harmless given the lack of a reasonable
likelihood of a different result if defendant had testified.

The

evidence incriminating defendant was strong compared to
defendant's unsupported claim that he was elsewhere at the time
of the robbery.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BURGLARY AND ROBBERY
CONVICTIONS WERE ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE
609(a)(1) AND (2).
At the close of the state's case, the trial court
denied defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence of his
prior robbery and burglary convictions, finding the evidence
admissible under Rule 609(a)(1) and (2) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence (R. 242). Subsequently, defendant decided not to take
the stand, allegedly, to avoid the introduction of his prior
convictions.

On appeal, he claims that the trial court's ruling

was erroneous and that the error was prejudicial because it
deprived him of the opportunity to testify in his own defense.
In deciding evidentiary issues, the trial court
exercises broad discretionary powers.
1032, 1035 (Utah 1987).

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d

Accordingly, the reviewing court should

not reverse the trial court's rulings on those matters unless "it
is manifest that the court so abused its discretion that there is
a likelihood that injustice resulted."

Icl. at 1035.

In the

instant case, the trial court ruled that evidence of defendant's
prior convictions was admissible under Rule 609(a)(1) and (2).
Defendant's prior convictions were admissible under
Rule 609(a)(1).
Under Rule 609(a)(1) the court may admit such evidence
given the following two conditions:

(1) defendant's prior

convictions must have been punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year; and (2) the evidence's probative value

outweighs its prejudicial effect.

Here, the admissibility of

defendant's prior convictions under the first condition is
undisputed.

However, defendant contends that the burglary and

robbery convictions were more prejudicial than probative and
should not have been admitted.
In State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986),
this Court set forth the following five factors to be considered
in deciding whether evidence of prior convictions is more
probative than prejudicial under Rule 609(a)(1):
[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on
the character for veracity of the witness.
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the prior
conviction. . .
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to the
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance
may lead the jury to punish the accused as a
bad person.
[4] the importance of credibility issues in
determining the truth in a prosecution tried
without decisive nontestimonial evidence. . .
[5] the importance of the accused's
testimony, as perhaps warranting the
exclusion of convictions probative of the
accused's character for veracity. . .
In the instant case, there are admittedly factors which weigh
against admission, such as the remoteness of the burglary
convictions and the similarity of the robbery conviction to the
trial charges.

However, the weight of those factors alone is

insufficient to conclude that in admitting the evidence, the
trial court so abused its discretion that "there is a likelihood
that injustice resulted."
First, unlike the offenses involved in Banner and
Gentry, the offenses for which defendant was previously convicted

are relevant to defendant's credibility.

In Banner and Gentry,

the defendant's prior convictions involved forcible sexual
offenses which this Court found irrelevant to ascertain the
defendant's character for veracity.

In the instant case,

defendant was previously convicted of burglary and robbery.

Both

offenses reflect on defendant's credibility, not because as
defendant accuses the state of arguing, people who commit one
crime are more likely to commit another, but because people who
have committed crimes in the past are more likely to try to cover
up their responsibility in the crime on trial to avoid the
harsher penalties associated with having been previously
convicted.
Secondly, as defendant contends, "credibility issues"
at trial were crucial in this case.

However, while defendant

seems to conclude that this factor weighs against the
admissibility of the impeaching evidence, in fact, the importance
of his credibility makes the investigation into defendant's
character for veracity all the more necessary.

Defendant

advanced his intent to introduce at trial an alibi defense, and
the only testimony offered by defendant pursuant to his alibi

The requirement that the defendant's prior crime be
indicative of his character for veracity under the factors set
forth in Banner must be distinguished from a similar requirement
contained in Rule 609(a)(2) Utah R. Evid. (1987). Under that
rule prior convictions are admissible to impeach a witness so
long as the prior crimes involve "dishonesty" or "false
statement," regardless of whether the convictions are punishable
by death or more than one year imprisonment. The Banner
requirement must be construed more narrowly than that contained
in Rule 609(a)(2). Otherwise, a finding under this single factor
would render the evidence admissible under Rule 609(a)(2), and
Rule 609(a)(1) Utah R. Evid. repetitive and unnecessary.

defense was his own.

Absent any other supporting evidence,

defendant's credibility becomes crucial for the jury's resolution
of the case.

Thus, the evidence was important to the State for

the very reason that defendant wanted to exclude it, and under
the fourth factor enumerated by this Court in Banner, the
centrality of defendant's credibility weighs in favor of
admissibility.
Further, not fully disregarding the importance of
defendant's testimony at trial, his testimony was not so crucial
that it warranted the exclusion of evidence indicative of his
credibility.

Given the fact that defendant never did take the

stand, it is hard to accurately determine how his testimony would
2
have affected the outcome of the trial.
Defendant contends that
his testimony was crucial to advance an alibi defense alleging
that he was not the man identified by the state's witnesses.
This testimony would have been in direct conflict with the
testimony of two state witnesses who identified defendant as the
perpetrator (R. 170, 212), and the victim's two prior
identifications of defendant, first from a picture line-up (R.
178) and then from a live line-up (R. 179). Moreover, defendant
had an opportunity to and did attack the witnesses' testimony by
impeaching their identification of him (R. 184-207, 215-217).
Yet, the jury chose to believe the witnesses testimony.
Defendant's testimony was not so crucial as to warrant the

This sort of difficulty played a crucial role in this
Court's decision in Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1035, 1036 to
prospectively require that a defendant testify at trial in order
to preserve a Rule 609(a) objection for appeal.

exclusion of evidence of his prior convictions, especially in
light of the fact set forth above that the convictions were
central to the issue of defendant's credibility and the outcome
of the case.
Finally, while the prior crimes for which defendant was
convicted are quite similar to the offense charged, this factor
does not per se exclude the impeaching evidence.

Such an

exclusionary rule "would lead to the unreasonable result of
treating more favorably a defendant who has committed the type of
crime charged more than once than one whose earlier crimes were
different."
omitted).

State v. McClure, 692 P.2d 97 (Or. 1984) (quotation
Thus, although the fact that the prior crimes for

which defendant was convicted are similar to the instant charge
counts against admission, a balance of all factors as set forth
above supports the trial court's decision admitting defendant's
prior convictions for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(1).
B. Defendant's Prior Convictions Were
Admissible Under Rule 609(a)(2).
Unlike Rule 609(a)(1) discussed above, which allows the
trial court discretion in determining the admissibility of the
impeaching evidence, Rule 609(a)(2) requires an automatic
admission of a witness' prior convictions involving "crimes of
dishonesty or false statement," in order to impeach his or her
testimony.

Defendant apparently concedes that the language of

the rule excludes any balancing test for this category of crimes
since he focuses on whether his crimes fit the category rather
than on any claim that further requirements exist.

Thus, in the

instant case, the only issue under Rule 609(a)(2) is whether

robbery and burglary, the crimes of which defendant was
previously convicted, involve "dishonesty or false statement"
within the meaning of the rule.
As defendant correctly points out, this Court has not
yet defined crimes of dishonesty or false statement under Rule
609(a)(2).

However, in State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah

1984), this Court unequivocally ruled that theft is a crime of
dishonesty under former Rule 21 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
This Court's decision in Cintron, decided after the adoption of
the new Rules of Evidence in 1983,

has not been overruled and is

controlling.
Defendant argues that this Court should disregard
Cintron, claiming that it is "old law" and inconsistent with the
purpose of the current rules.

(App. Br. at 6, n. 3.)

Yet,

defendant fails to demonstrate that Cintron is inconsistent with
the new Rules.

On the contrary, Rule 609(a) differs from Rule 21

only in that it imposed a new limitation on the admissibility of
prior felony convictions (i.e., crimes punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year) for impeachment purposes.
Accordingly, under Rule 609(a)(1), the trial court must weigh the
evidence's probative value against its prejudicial effect before
4
prior felonies can be admitted.
Rule 609(a)(2), however,
contains exactly the same requirements for admissibility of

See Cintron, 680 P.2d at 34.
4
Compare former Rule 21 which allowed, under the
statutory exception provision, for the automatic admission of
felony convictions for impeachment purposes. See Utah Code Ann.
S 78-24-9 (1953, as amended) (superseded by Rule 609(a)(1) Utah
R. Evid. (Supp. 1983).

crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement" as the old
rule.

Therefore, Cintron is consistent with the new Rules of

Evidence and should not be overruled.
In the instant case, defendant's prior convictions were
of burglary and robbery, not theft, as in Cintron.

Nevertheless,

the three crimes are similar in that they are all indicative of
dishonesty but do not involve false statement as obviously and
clearly as does perjury.

Yet, like fraud or embezzlement,

burglary and robbery are deceitful acts or crimes of dishonesty.
The burglar who secretly enters the private home concealing his
or her presence in that home is surely dishonest.

And the

robber's dishonesty is demonstrated in cases such as this one
where, pursuant to a criminal plan, the robber enters a store
posing as a customer and later on, disguises himself to avoid
identification.
Obviously, the two crimes do not necessarily involve
verbal false statement; however, there is no reason to conclude
that only verbal false statement is indicative of a witness'
propensity to lie.

A failure to speak can often be as deceitful

as an affirmative lie.

Both fraud and embezzlement can be

accomplished without an affirmative lie.

As defendant points

out, both fraud and embezzlement have been found to satisfy the
rule.

(App. Br. at 6 citing United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d

348, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).

Like theft, fraud and embezzlement,

burglary and robbery are crimes involving dishonesty within the

Compare former Rule 21 Utah R. Evid. with Rule
609(a)(2) Utah R. Evid. (1987).

meaning of Rule 609(a)(2) and therefore, automatically admissible
for impeaching purposes.
Other courts have ruled that the theft-burglary-robbery
type of crimes are admissible as crimes of "dishonesty" under
Rule 609(a)(2).

In United States v. Bianco, 419 F. Supp. 507

(E.D.Pa. 976), aff'd. 547 F.2d 1164 (3rd Cir. 1977), the district
court ruled that a prior conviction for breaking and entering,
and armed robbery were crimes of dishonesty.

The court thus

admitted the convictions for the limited purpose of impeachment.
See also, United States v. Ackridqe, 370 F. Supp. 214, 218 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) aff'd, 500 F.2d 1400 (1974); United States v. Gray, 468
F.2d 257 (3rd Cir. 1972); United States v. Baber, 447 F.2d 1267,
1269 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert, denied 404 U.S. 957 (1971).
Concededly, as defendant argues, other jurisdictions
have excluded robbery specifically from admission under Rule
609(a)(2) and burglary by implication.
are not binding on Utah.

However, those decisions

Cintron, on the other hand, provides a

Utah precedent which defines theft, a crime very much like those
involved in the instant case, within the ambit of crimes
involving dishonesty and false statement.

Therefore, the trial

court correctly denied defendant's motion to exclude evidence of
his prior burglary and robbery convictions.
C. The Trial Court's Denial Of Defendant's
Motion To Exclude Evidence Of His Prior
Convictions Constitutes, At Most, Harmless
Error.
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred in
failing to exclude evidence of defendant's prior convictions for
robbery and burglary, under both 609(a)(1) and (2), such error

does not warrant a reversal of defendant's conviction.

In

Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1038, this Court stated the standard of
review relevant to this case as follows:
[T]he standard for error in cases involving a
wrongful failure to exclude prior convictions
is whether "there was 'a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant.'" (Quotations omitted.)
In the instant case, it is highly unlikely that the
exclusion of evidence of defendant's prior crimes would have
exchanged the outcome of the trial.

The identity of defendant as

the man implicated in the G.E.M. Music Store robbery was the only
issue in dispute at trial, and the evidence identifying him as
the perpetrator was strong.

A few days after the robbery, the

victim picked defendant's photograph out of a picture line-up (R.
178).

A few days later, one of the perpetrators of that same

robbery, named him as an accomplice (R. 262). Soon thereafter,
the victim picked defendant out of a nine-man line up (R. 179).
Finally, both witnesses identified defendant during trial.

While

it is true that Mr. Martinez also picked a photograph of another
man during an initial photo line-up and may have said he was 90%
sure it was the robber, it was unnecessary for defendant to
testify to test this evidence adequately by cross examination of
Mr. Martinez.
Nevertheless, defendant claims that had he been allowed
to testify he would have convinced the jury that he was elsewhere
at the time of the robbery.

In order to prevail, however,

defendant had to convince the jury, without any supporting
evidence that, at the time of the robbery, he was somewhere else.

Further, defendant's testimony had to convince the jury against
the weight of the witnesses' prior identification of him as the
perpetrator, by name, through picture line-up and through live
line-up.

In addition, defendant's testimony had to be so

convincing as to lead the jury to believe that, not one, but two
unrelated witnesses lied before the trial and then on the stand
in a plot to implicate him in the robbery.
Given the overwhelming evidence identifying defendant
as the perpetrator of the G.E.M. Music Store robbery, and the
weakness of defendant's proposed alibi testimony, defendant's
testimony would not have altered the outcome of the trial.
Therefore, even if the trial court erred in failing to exclude
evidence of defendant's prior convictions, and even if that error
motivated defendant's decision not to testify, the trial court's
error is harmless and defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State requests
this Court to affirm defendant's conviction.
DATED t h i s

/7#f

day of
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, 1988.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
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SANDRA L. SJ(
A s s i s t a n t Atftorfiey General
In fact, defense counsel unsuccessfully attempted to
impeach the testimony of the two witnesses by pointing out
weaknesses in each witnesses' testimony. For example, counsel
extensively cross-examined Ms. Alder intimating that she
identified defendant as an accomplice in order to protect someone
else who supplied her with drugs (R. 215-217).
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